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This paper develops a new international trade model with capital market imperfec-
tions and endogenous borrowing costs in general equilibrium. Our theoretical model is
motivated by new empirical patterns from enterprise survey data of the World Bank.
Observing that a substantial fraction of the variation in nancial constraints is across
rms within industries, we allow for rm-specic exposure to nancial constraints.
This leads to credit rationing and divides producers into nancially constrained and
unconstrained ones. We show that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent
a new channel that reduces common gains from globalization. Trade liberalization
increases the demand for capital and thus the borrowing rate. This leads to a re-
allocation of market shares towards nancially unconstrained producers and a larger
fraction of credit-rationed rms. Both eects increase the within-industry variance of
rm outcomes and reduce welfare gains as consumers dislike heterogeneity in prices.
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1 Introduction
International activity of rms usually depends on access to external capital. Credit from
outside investors is used to nance production costs, machinery, the purchase of material
inputs and upfront investments. Empirical studies show that access to external capital and
nancial development are important determinants of trade activity. Countries with better-
developed nancial systems export relatively more in industries with higher dependence on
external nance and lower asset tangibility (Beck, 2003; Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2005; Manova,
2008, 2013). Based on international trade models with rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003),
existing theoretical work focuses on the interaction of credit constraints at the industry- or
country-level with ex-ante productivity dierences of rms. Recent empirical studies point to
the importance of heterogeneity across producers with respect to credit constraints. Financial
health and access to external nance are important determinants of export and innovation
activity, even after controlling for characteristics such as size and productivity (Berman &
Hericourt, 2010; Minetti & Zhu, 2011; Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2013; Muûls, 2015).
Furthermore, theoretical models mainly consider nancial frictions in a partial equilibrium
environment and treat borrowing costs as exogenously given.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the eects of globalization on rm performance
and consumer welfare when producers dier in their exposure to nancial frictions and
borrowing costs are endogenous. Therefore, we introduce a new international trade model
with heterogeneity in credit constraints at the rm-level and capital market clearing in
general equilibrium. To motivate our theoretical framework, we exploit enterprise survey
data from the World Bank and highlight three novel empirical patterns. First, the majority of
variation in the exposure to nancial constraints is across rms within industries rather than
between industries. Second, more nancially constrained industries show a larger variance
of rm sales. Third, countries with lower nancial development are characterized by a larger
within-country variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers.
Motivated by the rst empirical pattern, we introduce heterogeneity in credit frictions at
the rm-level. Firms require external capital to cover variable costs for the production of a
horizontally dierentiated variety. In contrast to the existing literature on rm heterogene-
ity in international trade, we assume that producers are homogenous in terms of marginal
costs, but dier in their exposure to nancial constraints. To motivate credit frictions, we
introduce a simple moral hazard problem between external investors and rm managers,
whereas the latter might have incentives to divert the received capital amount and not use
the funds in the production process. Incentives for managerial misbehavior dier across
agents which leads to credit rationing and divides producers into nancially constrained and
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unconstrained ones. If nancial institutions are imperfect, rm-specic credit constraints
translate into heterogeneity in rm performance such as prices and sales. Thus, our model
rationalizes the second and third empirical pattern and shows how credit frictions lead to
within-industry heterogeneity among producers, especially if nancial development is low. If
nancial institutions are perfect, credit frictions at the rm-level do not matter and producers
are homogenous.
Compared to existing theoretical work on nancial frictions in international trade, we
stress two additional channels of adjustment to trade liberalization. First, trade shocks
aect the selection of rms into constrained and unconstrained ones. Second, the interest
rate is endogenously determined and aected by trade liberalization. The main message of
this analysis is that aggregate implications of globalization can be very dierent if general
equilibrium eects on capital costs are taken into account. We model globalization as an
increase in the number of countries in the world economy. This approach allows us to
consider both a market size as well as a competition eect of trade liberalization. In partial
equilibrium, a rise in the number of countries increases industry scale due to the dominating
market size eect. However, competition from foreign rms reduces variable prots such
that credit constraints become tighter. Consequently, trade liberalization leads to a larger
fraction of nancially constrained producers.
Whereas the borrowing rate is exogenous in partial equilibrium, we endogenize capital
costs in general equilibrium. As rms face a larger market after globalization, capital demand
increases which leads to upward pressure on the interest rate. This general equilibrium
eect aggravates nancial constraints and has two implications on the industry. First, some
initially unconstrained rms face credit rationing and have to set higher prices. Second,
existing constrained producers are hurt more by increased borrowing costs leading to a
within-sector reallocation of prots towards unconstrained rms. These two adjustments
increase the within-industry variance of prices in the economy. Considering the indirect
utility associated with quadratic preferences as a welfare measure, consumers dislike price
heterogeneity. In general equilibrium, the endogenous adjustment of capital costs represents
an additional channel which reduces common gains from trade due to larger consumption
variety and pro-competitive eects.
Our model builds on the growing literature on imperfect capital markets in international
trade. Recent theoretical contributions introduce credit frictions in trade models with hetero-
geneous rms.1 This strand of literature diers regarding (i) the usage of external funds (e.g.
1See e.g. Muûls (2008), Manova (2013), and Chaney (2013) for extensions of the Melitz (2003) model by
nancial frictions. Peters & Schnitzer (2015) introduce borrowing constraints in the framework of Melitz &
Ottaviano (2008).
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trade related xed or variable costs), (ii) the theoretical motivation of nancial constraints
(e.g. moral hazard, imperfect contractibility, information asymmetry), and (iii) the under-
lying preference structure (e.g. CES vs. linear demand). To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the rst to introduce rm-specic credit frictions that lead to heterogeneity with
respect to rm performance in the absence of ex-ante productivity or wealth dierences.
Furthermore, existing work analyzes the eects of credit frictions on product markets in
general equilibrium without explicitly modelling capital markets. One exception is Foellmi
& Oechslin (2010) who also consider an endogenous interest rate determined by capital mar-
ket clearing. However, the focus of their approach is a dierent one. In a framework with
CES preferences and heterogeneity in wealth, they analyze the distributive impact of trade
liberalization in less-developed countries. The authors show that globalization impedes ac-
cess to external nance, especially for poor entrepreneurs, resulting in an increase of income
inequality in the economy. Formai (2013) analyzes the welfare implications of credit frictions
in a general equilibrium framework based on Melitz (2003). By assuming external nance
of sunk entry costs, credit frictions distort the entry decision of producers and lead to an
equilibrium with a too low number of inecient rms. In this framework, the author shows
that trade liberalization can lead to negative welfare eects.
In our paper, the crucial mechanism in general equilibrium is the endogenous adjustment
of the interest rate after globalization. Therefore, our analysis is related to models that
study how credit frictions aect international capital and trade ows. In a Heckscher-Ohlin
model with heterogeneous nancial frictions across countries and sectors, Antras & Caballero
(2009) show that trade integration increases the interest rate in nancially underdeveloped
countries. Whereas this result is driven by specialization and across-sector reallocation
of inputs, in our model interest rate adjustments after globalization lead to within-sector
reallocation of market shares between constrained and unconstrained rms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides empirical motivation for our
theoretical setup. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and discusses comparative statics
in partial equilibrium. The following section introduces the capital market and discusses
general equilibrium eects of globalization. Section 5 shows simulation results of the gains
from globalization in both partial and general equilibrium, and nally, section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical motivation
In this section, we present new empirical patterns that relate nancial constraints to the
variance in rm sales within industries and within countries. The empirical analysis is
entirely descriptive and aims to motivate the theoretical framework. First, we show that a
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substantial fraction of the total variation in the exposure to nancial constraints is across
rms within industries rather than between industries. This pattern implies that credit
frictions at the rm-level are important and that producers within the same industry face
very dierent degrees of credit rationing. Second, more nancially constrained industries
show a larger within-industry variance of rm sales. Third, countries with lower nancial
development are characterized by a larger within-country variance of rm sales and a higher
share of credit-rationed producers. The rst subsection describes the data set and variables
used. The second subsection presents empirical patterns that motivate our theoretical model.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Cross section 2002-2005
Tangible over total assets 13,267 0.21 0.14 0.22 0 1
Log sales 13,175 14.05 13.77 2.89 -2.16 28.79
Cross-section 2009
Share of constrained rms 18,911 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
Log sales 16,903 12.84 12.82 2.56 0.27 22.65
Cross-section 2013
Share of constrained rms 21,067 0.24 0 0.42 0 1
Log sales 16,737 12.28 12.20 2.38 -0.81 28.35
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES.
2.1 Data description
We use cross-sectional rm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES).2
We are interested in the relationship between nancial constraints and the variance of rm
sales both within industries and within countries. Following existing rm-level studies, the
rst part of the analysis uses the ratio of tangible assets over total assets (TOA) as a proxy
for access to external nance. We measure tangible assets as land and buildings which
reects the availability of collateral and thus better access to credit.3 As this measure is
only available for early waves of the enterprise surveys during the period 2002-2005, we
restrict our analysis to a cross-section with 13,267 rms from 15 countries.4 We use this
2The database is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
3Other studies that use similar proxies for nancial constraints are Greenaway et al. (2007), Berman &
Hericourt (2010), and Goerg & Spaliara (2013), among others. For a survey of empirical studies using rm-
level data see Wagner (2014). Results remain signicant and robust if we include machinery and equipment
in our proxy for tangible assets.
4The countries are Bangladesh, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Nicaragua,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, and Zambia.
4
Figure 1: Within- and between-industry variation of tangible assets
continuous proxy for credit access to investigate the variation in the exposure to nancial
constraints across rms within industries and between industries. Furthermore, we compute
the mean of tangible over total assets by industry and country and relate it to the variance
in log sales across rms. As the variables are reported in local currency units, we convert it
to 2005 U.S. dollars.
The second part of the empirical analysis further investigates the relationship between
nancial constraints and the variance of rm sales at the country-level. Therefore, we exploit
cross-section data for the years 2009 and 2013 which is available for a larger set of countries.5
We use domestic credit to the private sector in percentage of GDP as a proxy for nancial
development and relate it to the within-country variance of rm sales as well as the share of
nancially constrained producers by country.6 To obtain the latter measure, we consider a
survey question which asks rms to state whether access to nancing (including availability
and costs) is an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment. The categorical
variable ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle).7 We introduce a dummy
variable for nancially constrained producers which takes the value of 1 if rms perceive
access to nancing as a major or very severe obstacle (values 3 and 4 of the categorical
variable). We take means by country as a measure for credit constraints. Table 1 provides
summary statistics of the variables of interest.
5Tables 6 and 7 in the Data Appendix show summary statistics by country for the years 2009 and 2013.
6The data is taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
7Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2013) use self-reported information from the 2002 and 2005 Business En-
vironment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 27 transition countries to analyze the eect of
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Figure 2: TOA and variance of sales within-industry (left) and within-country (right)
2.2 Empirical results
The rst pattern decomposes the total variation in the measure for credit access (tangible
over total assets) into within- and between-industry variation. Figure 1 shows results for
ve countries at three levels of industry aggregation and reveals that a substantial part of
the variation is within industries. The observed pattern suggests that rms within the same
industry are aected very dierently by credit constraints.8
Empirical pattern 1 The majority of the variation in nancial constraints is across rms
within industries rather than between industries.
In a second step, we use the mean of the rm-level tangible assets over total assets ratio
to compute a measure for credit access at the industry-level. We relate this proxy to the
within-industry variation of rm sales. The left panel of Figure 2 depicts within-industry
variances of rm-level sales, whereas the right panel shows results at the country-level. To
compute the within-industry variances, we restrict our analysis to sectors with more than 25
rm observations. Figure 2 shows that industries with a higher ratio of tangible over total
assets are characterized by a lower within-industry variance of rm sales. Table 2 shows the
negative correlation coecients, whereas only the relationship for industries is signicant at
the 5% level.
The observed pattern suggests that the exposure to credit constraints is positively asso-
ciated with rm heterogeneity. In sectors with lower asset tangibility, rms tend to be more
nancially constrained on average and dier more in terms of sales. Our theoretical model
8This pattern holds for all countries with available data in our sample. Table 5 in the Data Appendix
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Figure 3: Financial development and within-country heterogeneity
rationalizes this second pattern as dierences in nancial frictions at the rm-level lead to
a larger heterogeneity in rm performance within industries for which credit constraints are
more restrictive.
Table 2: Correlation credit constraints and variance of rm performance
Variance of rm sales Within-industry Within-country
Industry / Country mean TOA -0.2279** -0.2373
Obs. 87 15
Notes: ** indicates 5% signicance.
Empirical pattern 2 More nancially constrained industries are characterized by a larger
variance of rm sales.
We use more recent cross-section data of the WBES for the years 2009 and 2013, which
is available for a larger set of countries, to investigate the relationship between nancial
development and rm heterogeneity at the country-level. For the year 2009, the left panel of
Figure 3 shows a signicantly negative relationship between domestic credit provided to the
private sector (in % of GDP) and the within-country variance of rm sales. Furthermore, the
right panel depicts that nancial development is associated with a lower share of nancially
constrained rms within a country. Table 3 summarizes the correlation coecients for both
years and furthermore shows that the share of nancially constrained producers is positively
related to the variance of rm sales in a country.9
9For the cross-section of the year 2013, Figure 10 in the Data Appendix shows the relationship between
nancial development and within-country heterogeneity. Figure 11 relates the share of nancially constrained
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Table 3: Correlation credit constraints and variance of rm performance
Within-country variance sales Share constrained rms
2009 2013 2009 2013
Private credit / GDP -0.3884*** -0.4312*** -0.4683*** -0.2692*
Obs. 51 39 54 40
Share constrained rms 0.4539*** 0.4051***
Obs. 54 44
Notes: *** indicates 1% signicance, * 10% signicance.
Empirical pattern 3 Countries with lower nancial development are characterized by a
larger within-country variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers.
Motivated by these empirical patterns, the next section introduces a new international
trade model with heterogeneity in credit frictions at the rm-level. Existing theoretical
work introduces nancial frictions in international trade models with heterogeneous rms a
la Melitz (2003). Credit constraints at the industry- or country-level interact with hetero-
geneity in productivity, whereby the latter determines a rm's access to external nance.
Therefore, nancial frictions increase the cuto productivity and intensify the selection of
most productive rms into exporting. In contrast to previous work, we assume that produc-
ers are homogeneous with respect to marginal production costs, but dier in their exposure
to credit constraints. This assumption is consistent with the rst empirical pattern that
points to the importance of within-industry variation in nancial frictions across produc-
ers. Furthermore, recent empirical work exploits rm-level measures of nancial constraints.
Berman & Hericourt (2010), Minetti & Zhu (2011), as well as Muûls (2015) show that nan-
cial health and access to external nance are important determinants of export activity, even
after controlling for rm characteristics as size and productivity. In our theoretical model,
rm-specic dierences in the exposure to credit constraints translate into variation in rm
performance such as price setting and sales if nancial institutions are imperfect. Hence,
the model rationalizes a positive relationship between credit market imperfections and rm
heterogeneity as shown in the empirical patterns 2 and 3. The link between credit frictions
and international trade is particularly relevant in developing countries where the quality
of nancial institutions is low (Banerjee & Duo, 2005, 2014). We use this framework to
analyze how various shocks induce dierential eects across rms within industries in the
presence of credit frictions. The next section presents the setup of the theoretical model.
rms to the within-country variance of rm sales.
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3 The model
This section develops a model of international trade with heterogeneity in credit frictions at
the rm-level. The world economy consists of k identical countries, each of which is populated
by a number of L consumers and an exogenous mass of m producers. We motivate nancial
frictions by a simple moral hazard problem between borrowing rms and external investors.
The following subsection presents the demand side of the model, whereas we assume a
quadratic specication of preferences and derive market demand by aggregating over the
number of consumers in the economy. Section 3.2 shows how rms optimally behave in the
presence of capital market imperfections depending on their exposure to nancial frictions.
The industry equilibrium, outlined in section 3.3, is determined by total industry output
and an endogenous share of credit-rationed producers. Finally, in section 3.4, we analyze
the eects of globalization and of an interest rate shock in partial equilibrium.
3.1 Consumer side





q(i)di, where the index i represents one variety and 














The quadratic utility function depends on the non-negative preference parameters a, b and on
an inverse measure of product dierentiation e which lies between 0 and 1. Lower values of e
imply that products are more dierentiated and hence less substitutable. If e = 1, consumers
have no taste for diversity in products and demand depends on aggregate output Q only.





I, where p (i) denotes the price for variety i and I is individual income.10 The maximization
problem yields the linear inverse demand function:
p(i) = a  b [(1  e)q(i) + eQ] , (2)
where  is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget
constraint. As rms are innitesimally small in the economy, they take  as given. In the
10In general equilibrium, aggregate income consists of rm prots and factor income. We assume that
capital is the only factor of production. Section 4 discusses the general equilibrium of the model.
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following, we set the marginal utility of income as the numeraire equal to one.11 To ensure
market-clearing, total output of each rm equals the aggregate demand of all consumers in
the world economy: x(i) = kLq(i). Hence, the inverse world market demand is given by:
p(i) = a  b0 [(1  e)x(i) + eX] , (3)
where a is the consumers' maximum willingness to pay and b0  b
kL
is an inverse measure for




x (i) di represents the total volume of varieties produced
and consumed in the world economy.
3.2 Firm's maximization problem
The industry consists of an exogenous mass ofm rms, each producing a horizontally dieren-
tiated variety i. Firms receive revenues p(i)x(i) and have to nance total variable production
costs cx(i) by external capital. There are no xed costs of production. Motivated by empir-
ical pattern 1 and the rm-level evidence on nancial frictions and export performance, we
assume that rms are homogeneous in marginal production costs c, but dier in their expo-
sure to credit constraints. If nancial institutions are imperfect, only a fraction of producers
can overcome credit frictions, receives the required capital amount and is able to produce
the optimal output. In contrast, rms with high exposure to credit constraints suer from
underprovision of external capital and cannot behave optimally. In equilibrium, the share
of nancially unconstrained rms is endogenously determined and aected by trade shocks.
As we are interested in the eects of globalization on producers with dierent exposure to
credit constraints, we do not consider endogenous entry and exit decisions. In the following,
we describe the rm's maximization problem and introduce credit frictions at the rm- as
well as the country-level.
The decision problem of a producer consists of two stages. At date t = 0, the rm
borrows the credit amount d(i) from an outside investor at the interest rate r. In partial
equilibrium, the interest rate is treated as exogenous, whereas we endogenize it in general
equilibrium as discussed in section 4. To motivate credit frictions at the rm-level, we
introduce a managerial action which is non-veriable for outside investors and hence prone
to moral hazard.12 After credit provision, the manager of the rm can choose whether to use
the external funds for production or divert the credit amount and invest it for own purposes.
11Using the marginal utility of income as a numeraire ( = 1) is standard in the literature of oligopoly in
general equilibrium (GOLE). See Neary (2003) for further discussion.
12See Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) as well as Tirole (2006) for moral hazard in corporate nance. Recent
papers that introduce credit constraints motivated by moral hazard in a trade context are Ehrlich & Seidel
(2013) and Egger & Keuschnigg (2015).
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At date t = 1, production yields prots which consist of revenues net of loan repayment:
(i) = p(i)x(i)  rd(i), (4)
whereas the rm faces the following budget constraint:
d(i)  cx(i). (5)
Alternatively, the manager can choose to divert the loan without using the provided capital in
the production process. In this case, no revenues are realized and the loan cannot be repaid.
Instead the manager reaps a share (i) (1  ) of the credit amount d(i) and invests it on the
capital market at interest rate r. Hence, the non-veriable private benet from managerial
misbehavior at date t = 1 is equal to rd(i)(i) (1  ). We follow Antras et al. (2009) and
assume that private benets are negatively related to the quality of nancial institutions
captured by the parameter  2 [0; 1] : Countries with better nancial institutions (larger
) tend to enforce laws that limit the ability of managers to divert funds or enjoy private
benets.13 In contrast to standard moral hazard approaches, we assume that producers are
located at the unit interval and are heterogeneous in the share (i) 2 [0; 1], which we denote
the agency costs of a rm i, whereby a higher (i) increases the private benet and thus the
incentive for managerial misbehavior. This assumption introduces heterogeneity in credit
constraints at the rm-level. To prevent misbehavior of agents and thus losses from lending,
investors have to ensure that the following incentive constraint holds:
(i)  (i) (1  ) rd(i): (6)
At period t = 1, prots in case of production and loan repayment have to be (weakly) higher
than private benets in case of misbehavior. Rearranging equation (6) shows that moral
hazard restricts the borrowing capacity:
d(i) 
p(i)x(i)
r [1 + (i) (1  )]
: (7)
Firms with high agency costs (i) derive large private benets from diverting the loan.
Hence, investors restrict credit provision to prevent managerial misbehavior. If nancial
institutions are perfect ( = 1), managers have no incentives to misbehave and equation (6)
collapses to a zero-prot condition. In this case, dierences in agency costs (i) play no
role and rms are homogenous. In contrast, if nancial institutions are imperfect ( < 1),
13See Tirole (2006) as well as Antras et al. (2009) for a similar notion of nancial contract enforcement
in models with moral hazard.
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rm-specic moral hazard divides agents into two groups. First, producers with relatively
low (i) choose the optimal output level as the nancial constraint is not binding. Second,
rms with higher agency costs face credit rationing and have to restrict production. To solve
for outputs and prices, rms maximize prots (4) subject to the budget constraint (5) and
the nancial constraint (7).
Constrained rms For rms with high agency costs (i), the nancial constraint is bind-
ing such that the constrained price equals the eective marginal production costs:
pC () = cr [1 + (i) (1  )] : (8)
Producing one unit of the good yields the price pC () which has to compensate for the
marginal production costs cr and the opportunity costs of diligent behavior cr(i) (1  ).
The quantity of credit-rationed producers is given by:
xC () =
a  b0eX   cr [1 + (i) (1  )]
b0 (1  e)
: (9)
More nancially constrained rms with a higher value of (i) face larger opportunity costs
of production and have to set higher prices which results in lower outputs.
Unconstrained rms For unconstrained rms, the nancial constraint is not binding
such that optimal output is independent of (i):
xU =
a  b0eX   rc
b0 (2  e)
: (10)
By inserting equation (10) into the inverse demand function (3), we derive the optimal price
of unconstrained rms:
pU =
a  b0eX + (1  e) rc
2  e
: (11)
In our model, the only source of rm heterogeneity occurs in . As optimal output (10) and
prices (11) do not depend on , all unconstrained producers behave in the same way. It can
be shown that unconstrained rms charge lower prices, earn higher markups and oer higher
quantities compared to credit-rationed producers.
3.3 Industry equilibrium
In equilibrium, we derive a critical value of agency costs e above which rms are nancially










Figure 4: Output prole of constrained and unconstrained rms
(6) is just binding and insert the optimal output from equation (10) which leads to:
e = a  b
0eX   cr
(2  e) (1  ) cr
: (12)
In a particular industry, a fraction e of rms is unconstrained and chooses the identical
optimal output as shown in Figure 4. Following equation (9), output of constrained rms
decreases in agency costs . Equation (12) shows that the higher the industry output
X, and therefore the tougher the competition, the more rms are nancially constrained.
Furthermore, conditional on industry output X, the fraction of unconstrained producers
decreases in credit costs cr and, consistent with empirical pattern 3, increases in the quality
of nancial institutions . To arrive at an output prole as depicted in Figure 4, we impose
two conditions. First, to ensure that both groups of rms occur, the threshold value of e
has to be smaller than one.
Condition 1 e < 1 if a b0eX
cr
< 1 + (1  ) (2  e)
Second, the output of the rm with the highest agency costs ( (i) = 1) has to be positive.
Otherwise it would not be active in the market.




Inserting Condition 2 in equation (12) leads to a lower limit value for the share of un-














Figure 5: Industry equilibrium and trade liberalization







xC () di: (13)



























 (i) di being the average agency costs within the group of constrained
producers. Figure 5 depicts the industry equilibrium. As the world economy consists of m
producers in k countries, the aggregate output is given by: X = kmex. Equations (12) and
(14) represent two relationships between the two endogenous variables e and ex. The curve
Cutoff : e (ex) illustrates equation (12) and determines the fraction of nancially constrained
rms dependent on average industry output. Intuitively, the negative slope captures the fact
that higher industry scale increases competition and forces more rms into the constrained




is derived from equation (14) and reects that with a higher
critical value e more rms are unconstrained and thus choose optimal output levels. Hence,
average industry scale increases. The intersection of the two curves in Figure 5 characterizes
the industry equilibrium.
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3.4 Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The previous section has characterized the partial equilibrium in the economy. In a next
step, we investigate how globalization and an exogenous change in the interest rate aect our
equilibrium. All results are derived by total dierentiation of the two equilibrium conditions
(12) and (14). See Appendix 7.1 for a detailed derivation.
Globalization Following Eckel & Neary (2010), we interpret globalization as an increase
in the number of countries k in the integrated world economy. This shock aects optimal rm
behavior through two channels. On the one hand, producers face a market size eect which
corresponds to an increase in the number of consumers L. On the other hand, globalization
is associated with increased competition from foreign rms. Therefore, this competition
eect works like a rise in the number of producers m. To gain intuition for the eects of
globalization, we analyze the two channels separately.
From equation (3), we observe that a larger market rotates the inverse world demand
outwards without aecting the intercept. Thus, rms face a larger demand and raise output
levels resulting in a one-to-one increase in industry scale. This market size eect is coun-























upwards and the curve Cutoff :
e (ex) outwards in Figure 5. A larger market increases the pledgeable income and thus relaxes
the nancial constraint (6). As Figure 5 shows, the change in market size does not aect
the share of credit-rationed producers in equilibrium. However, the competition eect leads
to a partial backward shift of the two curves. A greater number of competitors producing

















Tougher competition reduces rm revenues and therefore pledgeable income as shown by
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equation (7). If goods are perfectly dierentiated (e = 0), the competition eect disappears
and globalization leads to a one-to-one increase in output without aecting the share of
nancially constrained producers.
Proposition 1 In partial equilibrium, globalization increases industry scale as the positive
market size eect dominates the counteracting competition eect. The latter increases the
share of nancially constrained producers (lower e).
Borrowing costs In this section, we analyze the eects of an exogenous change in the
interest rate r. An increase in the borrowing costs reduces average industry scale ex and







Proposition 2 In partial equilibrium, an exogenous increase in the borrowing rate leads to
a higher share of nancially constrained rms and reduces industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
For both groups, an increase in the borrowing rate has a direct negative impact on rm
outputs, whereby the eect is stronger for credit-rationed rms. By comparing equations
(9) and (10), this can be explained by the agency problem which leads to higher eective
marginal production costs for nancially constrained producers. Whereas credit-rationed
agents experience strong contraction, total dierentiation of equation (10) shows a counter-
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CCA 7 0: (18)
Besides the direct negative impact of an increase in the interest rate, unconstrained producers
optimally react to the reduction in industry scale by an increase of individual output. If
varieties are perfectly dierentiated (e = 0), the latter eect vanishes and unconstrained
rms clearly reduce sales. However, the larger is the substitutability of goods, the more
unconstrained rms benet from reductions of rival rms' outputs.





The partial equilibrium analysis is based on the assumption that the interest rate is exoge-
nously given. This implies that capital supply is completely elastic. In the next subsection,
we endogenize the interest rate by introducing a simple capital market with xed supply. In
the following, we analyze how endogenous adjustments of borrowing costs aect the implica-
tions of globalization. Furthermore, we show the impact of nancial development in general
equilibrium.
4.1 Capital market clearing
Each rm has to cover variable production costs by external nance and hence demands
cxj (i) units of capital, with j 2 C;U . We assume that the economy is endowed with a xed
amount of capital KS. In equilibrium, the inelastic supply of capital has to be equal to total
capital demand KD of m rms in a country:
































We add equation (19) to the system of equations from the partial equilibrium analysis (12)
and (14). In general equilibrium, prots and capital income determine the aggregate income
of consumers I. A rise in the interest rate r has no eect on aggregate income as the resulting
increase in capital income is exactly oset by a decrease in rm prots.
4.2 Comparative statics in general equilibrium
This section analyzes the eects of globalization and changes in nancial development in
general equilibrium. As capital market clearing pins down the average industry scale ex, we
express our equilibrium by two equations in the endogenous variables r and e. The curve
CUT : e (r) in Figure 6 combines capital market clearing (19) with the nancial condition
(12). Intuitively, the curve is downward sloping as a higher interest rate increases the share














Figure 6: Globalization in general equilibrium
e such that the capital market is in equilibrium. A higher share of unconstrained producers
leads to an increase of average output and thus to higher capital demand. To ensure capital
market clearing, the interest rate has to rise.
Globalization In general equilibrium, the xed capital amount determines average indus-
try output. Therefore, in contrast to section 3.4, globalization (an increase in k) has no








in Figure 6. For a given
share of nancially constrained rms, the dominating market size eect increases capital




The curve CUT : e (r) is unaected such that the new equilibrium is characterized by the
intersection point with the new capital market clearing condition. Consequently, the share
of nancially constrained producers increases as higher borrowing costs impose stronger





Proposition 3 In general equilibrium, globalization increases the interest rate and the share
of nancially constrained rms, but has no eect on industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
Comparing equations (16) and (23) shows that globalization leads to a stronger increase
in the share of nancially constrained producers in general equilibrium (see Appendix 7.2 for
a formal proof). This result is driven by the endogenous increase in borrowing costs which
forces more rms into the constrained status. In contrast to partial equilibrium, the increase
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The increase in the number of countries k aects optimal rm behavior in two opposing
ways. As shown in partial equilibrium, the market size eect dominates the competition
eect which induces rms to increase outputs. The endogenous adjustment of the interest
rate in general equilibrium counteracts the positive impact of globalization. The latter eect
especially hurts nancially constrained producers with high agency costs (i) shown by the
larger weight of the interest rate in equation (25) compared to unconstrained rms (24).
Proposition 4 In general equilibrium, globalization leads to an output expansion among
unconstrained rms, whereas nancially constrained producers have to reduce output due to
increased capital costs.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
The expansion among unconstrained rms is illustrated in Figure 7 by an upward shift of
the output prole. In contrast, credit-rationed producers suer from increased capital costs
and thus decrease output depending on their agency costs. As the most constrained rm with
 = 1 faces the strongest output reduction, the constrained output prole rotates clockwise.
The slope is given by   cr(1 )
b0(1 e)
(compare equation (9)) and thus increases in the interest rate
and the market size. The dierential responses across the two groups of producers increase
the variance of output and prices within the industry. This result will be crucial for the
welfare consequences which we discuss in more detail in section 5. As average industry scale
is unaected due to xed capital supply, the output gain of unconstrained rms (region A











Figure 7: Output proles and globalization
Financial development An increase in  reduces the incentives to reap private benets
and thus enhances the pledgeability of revenues. This shock can be interpreted as an im-
provement of nancial contract enforcement. Comparable to trade liberalization, there is no
eect on aggregate output due to xed capital supply. However, an increase in  relaxes the




Furthermore, the increase in pledgeable income translates into higher capital demand and




Proposition 5 In general equilibrium, higher nancial development decreases the share of
nancially constrained rms and increases the borrowing rate.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
An improvement in the quality of nancial institutions increases the borrowing capacity
of credit-rationed rms. This direct positive eect is counteracted by an increase in capital
costs. Whereas nancially constrained rms expand output, unconstrained producers do not
15Appendix 7.1 provides the eects of nancial development in partial equilibrium which are not discussed











Figure 8: Output proles and nancial development




















Consequently, an increase in nancial development induces a reallocation of market shares
towards credit-rationed producers. This eect can be seen graphically by a downward shift
of the unconstrained output prole as well as an outward rotation of the output line for
constrained rms in Figure 8.
Proposition 6 Consistent with empirical pattern 3, in general equilibrium, higher nancial
development reduces the variance of sales within an industry as nancially constrained rms
expand outputs at the expense of unconstrained producers.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
5 Welfare
This section analyzes how globalization aects consumer welfare. In a rst step, we derive a
welfare measure for a representative consumer. We use the latter for a numerical simulation
of the eects of trade liberalization on consumer welfare.
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5.1 Indirect utility
As an appropriate measure for consumer welfare, we derive the indirect utility function for
a representative consumer associated with the preference structure in equation (1). As we
choose the marginal utility of income as numeraire ( = 1), indirect utility can be expressed
as follows:
U = km




  [1 + e (km  1)] (2c + 
2
u)
2b(1  e) [1 + e (km  1)]
: (30)
The welfare measure increases in the rst moments of prices for unconstrained and con-
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)di, and decreases in the second











of the utility function is comparable to welfare measures in general oligopolistic equilibrium
models.16 In these papers, consumer welfare decreases in the variance of prices which in our






for j 2 C;U . Two important properties of the
welfare function will be crucial for the subsequent analysis. Following from the preference
structure in equation (1), consumers love variety and dislike heterogeneity in consumption
levels and prices.
5.2 Welfare eects of trade liberalization
The aim of this section is to analyze the welfare implications of globalization. We simulate
the changes of consumer welfare (30) to globalization and compare results in partial and
general equilibrium.17 Similar to our previous analysis, we rst consider only the market
size eect of globalization (change in the number of consumers L). Subsequently, we take
into account that trade liberalization increases competition and the number of varieties
available to consumers (change in k).
Market size eect The market size eect reects increased export opportunities after
globalization. The left panel of Figure 9 shows that a larger market has no eect on consumer
welfare in partial equilibrium (PE), but leads to welfare losses in general equilibrium (GE).
This dierence is driven by the endogenous adjustment of the borrowing rate when the
capital market equilibrium is taken into account.
As equation (30) shows, consumer welfare depends on the rst and second moments of
prices for both groups. In partial equilibrium, an increase in the market size L leads to
16Compare e.g. Neary (2009), among others.
17We simulate the model in general equilibrium with MATLAB. The simulation code is available from the
authors upon request.
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Figure 9: Welfare eects of market size (L) and globalization (k)
a proportional expansion of output among all rms without aecting optimal price setting
and the share of unconstrained rms e (compare section 3.4). Therefore, consumer welfare
does not respond to changes in the market size as the rst and second moments of prices
remain constant. In contrast, increased capital demand raises the interest rate in general
equilibrium which leads to a higher variance of prices and thus to welfare losses. As discussed
in section 4.2, higher borrowing costs increase the within-industry variance of prices in two
ways. First, a larger fraction of rms becomes nancially constrained (lower e). Second,
unconstrained producers expand output at the expense of credit-rationed rms.
Globalization By considering the eect of an increase in the number of countries k; we
introduce two additional channels how globalization aects consumer welfare (30). In con-
trast to the left graph, the right panel of Figure 9 shows that globalization leads to welfare
gains both in partial and general equilibrium resulting from (i) lower prices due to increased
competition and (ii) larger consumption variety. Importantly, the positive welfare eects are
considerably lower in general equilibrium. Whereas the partial equilibrium analysis reects
well-known gains from trade through competition and larger variety, our model stresses an
additional negative welfare channel of globalization driven by an increase in capital costs.
Whereas unconstrained rms benet from trade liberalization due to the market size eect,
the higher interest rate especially hurts the most constrained producers (with high values
of ). Compared to existing work, the negative welfare channel of a larger market is driven
by two components of our model. First, the introduction of heterogeneity in nancial fric-
tions at the rm-level induces endogenous selection of producers into unconstrained and
constrained groups. Second, by considering capital market clearing in general equilibrium,
the interest rate is endogenized and increases with globalization. In the presence of rm-
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specic credit frictions and endogenous capital costs, trade liberalization leads to a larger
variance of prices and reduces positive welfare eects. Table 4 shows outcomes of endogenous
variables for dierent values of market size L and the number of countries k.
Table 4: Numerical simulation of trade liberalization
L UPE UGE XPE XGE ePE eGE rPE rGE
1 4185:43 4185:44 25:00 25:00 0:83 0:83 1:38 1:38
1:05 4185:43 4020:04 26:25 25:00 0:83 0:77 1:38 1:44
1:10 4185:43 3865:51 27:50 25:00 0:83 0:73 1:38 1:49
1:15 4185:43 3721:02 28:75 25:00 0:83 0:70 1:38 1:54
1:20 4185:43 3585:79 30:00 25:00 0:83 0:67 1:38 1:58
1:25 4185:43 3471:36 31:12 25:00 0:83 0:64 1:38 1:61
k UPE UGE XPE XGE ePE eGE rPE rGE
1 4185:43 4185:44 25:00 25:00 0:83 0:83 1:38 1:38
1:05 4321:50 4203:75 25:85 25:00 0:82 0:78 1:38 1:42
1:10 4452:66 4219:42 26:68 25:00 0:81 0:74 1:38 1:46
1:15 4579:11 4232:84 27:48 25:00 0:80 0:71 1:38 1:49
1:20 4701:08 4244:33 28:25 25:00 0:79 0:68 1:38 1:51
1:25 4807:18 4253:25 28:92 25:00 0:78 0:66 1:38 1:54
Notes: The table presents outcomes of endogenous variables for dif-
ferent values of L and k. The following parameter values are chosen:
a = 100, b = 1, m = 2; e = 0:3; c = 30,  = 0:25; KS = 1500:
Policy implications The additional negative welfare channel of globalization is especially
relevant if nancial development is low and credit frictions are signicant. Thus, from a policy
perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization should be accompanied by nancial
reforms that aim to mitigate negative eects. To do so, our theoretical framework suggests
two potential policy measures: an improvement in the quality of nancial institutions  or an
increase in capital supply KS. Both measures reduce price heterogeneity and hence dampen
potential welfare losses, but work through dierent channels. An increase in  alleviates
credit frictions and induces a reallocation of market shares towards nancially constrained
producers (see the discussion in section 4.2). As a second measure, globalization should be
accompanied by an increase in capital supply KS to weaken the increase in borrowing costs
which benets all rms.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new international trade model with rm-specic credit frictions
and endogenous adjustments of capital costs in general equilibrium. Producers oer a hor-
izontally dierentiated variety and have to nance variable production costs by external
capital. We motivate credit frictions by a simple moral hazard problem between borrowing
rms and outside investors. This agency problem restricts the pledgeable income which can
be oered to lenders and leads to credit rationing in equilibrium. A key element of our model
is that rms dier with respect to agency costs and thus are heterogeneous in their exposure
to credit constraints.
The contributions of this framework are twofold. First, our model rationalizes a positive
relationship between rm heterogeneity and the extent of nancial constraints. Exploiting
the enterprise surveys data of the World Bank, we show that stronger credit frictions at
the industry-level as well as lower nancial development at the country-level are positively
associated with a larger variance of rm sales. In our model, if nancial institutions are
perfect, producers are homogenous in terms of performance. However, if nancial institu-
tions are imperfect, dierences in agency costs divide rms into nancially constrained and
unconstrained producers and lead to heterogeneity in sales.
Second, we use this framework to analyze the eects of globalization on rm performance
and consumer welfare. The main idea is that aggregate implications of trade liberalization
are very dierent if general equilibrium eects on capital costs are taken into account. In
general equilibrium, we show that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent an
additional channel which reduces gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases capital
demand which pushes the borrowing rate upwards. This general equilibrium eect induces a
within-sector reallocation of prots towards unconstrained rms at the expense of nancially
constrained producers, and increases the share of credit-rationed producers. We show that
these adjustments increase the variance of prices and reduce consumer welfare.
From a policy perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization could lead to
negative welfare eects and should be accompanied by nancial reforms to counteract an
increase in within-industry heterogeneity across rms. This implication is especially relevant
in developing countries where credit frictions are signicant and nancial development is low.
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7 Mathematical Appendix
7.1 Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The partial equilibrium is characterized by two endogenous variables e and ex in equations
(12) and (14). Totally dierentiating the two equilibrium conditions and writing the results
in matrix notation yields:
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The determinant of the coecient matrix is given by:
 = (1  ) (2  e) crL
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In the following, we proof Proposition 2 in the main body and show partial equilibrium
results for an exogenous change in the nancial development parameter .
Proposition 2 (Interest rate eect) In partial equilibrium, we analyze the eects of an
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Proof. To show that d ln
e
d ln r
< 0, it is sucient to proof that (2  e) e  1+e
2
2
> 0. As the latter
expression increases in e, inserting the lowest possible cuto value el = 12 e (see Condition





Financial development For the sake of completeness, we present the results for an ex-
ogenous change in the parameter  which are not discussed in the main body of the paper.
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7.2 Comparative statics in general equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we add the capital market clearing condition to our system of equa-
tions. The three endogenous variables e, ex, and r are determined in equations (12), (14),



























































whereas the determinant of the coecient matrix is given by:












Proposition 3 (Globalization) In general equilibrium, a higher number of countries k






































Comparing the eects on e in partial and general equilibrium, as shown in equations (16)
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whereas the proof in Proposition 2 ensures that the last term is positive.
Proposition 4 (Firm-level eects of globalization) Inserting the interest rate eect


















2  e+ (i) (1  ) (2  e)






As xU > ex and 1 e2 e e+(2 e)(1 e)0c(1 ) < 1, the eect of globalization on unconstrained
output (38) is clearly positive.
Proof. In the case of constrained rms, note that xC () < ex. A sucient condition for a
negative eect of globalization on constrained output is that the last fraction of expression




. Evaluating this condition for the









Thus, the eect of globalization is negative for all rms with (i)  e.
Proposition 5 (Financial development) The eect of nancial development on the






















Following the proof in Proposition 2, the expression is clearly positive. Finally, the eect of


















Proposition 6 (Firm-level eects of nancial development) To show that the eect
of nancial development on constrained output (29) is unambiguously positive, we insert



























Proof. As the numerator of the term in brackets increases in e, we insert the lower bound






Table 5: Within-industry and between-industry variation of TOA
2-digit 3-digit 4-digit
Country Obs. within between within between within between
Chile 894 89.56 10.44 88.76 11.24 84.24 15.76
El Salvador 349 95.18 4.82 88.2 11.8 79.51 20.49
Guatemala 421 95.48 4.52 92.05 7.95 77.33 22.67
Honduras 401 90.86 9.14 81.63 18.37 76.45 23.55
Madagascar 123 91.46 8.54 80.64 19.36 78.11 21.89
South Africa 495 98.48 1.52 86.74 13.26 76.75 23.25
Thailand 718 93.14 6.86 92.37 7.63 91.26 8.74
Vietnam 1,048 98.52 1.48 97.92 2.08 83.68 16.32
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. Due to data availability,
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Figure 11: Credit constraints and variance of sales, for years 2009 (left) and 2013 (right)
Table 6: Summary statistics at the country level, cross-section 2013
2013
Country Obs. PC / GDP CF VS Country Obs. PC / GDP CF VS
Albania 357 37.58 0.08 3.04 Kosovo 198 34.94 0.40 -
Armenia 359 45.18 0.28 2.83 Latvia 332 60.70 0.15 4.16
Azerbaijan 390 25.46 0.25 2.40 Lebanon 558 98.64 0.39 3.15
Bangladesh 1,437 41.79 0.25 4.85 Lithuania 263 46.22 0.15 3.52
Belarus 353 24.15 0.13 3.19 Madagascar 336 11.92 0.18 -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 360 62.01 0.16 2.11 Moldova 350 39.74 0.10 3.86
Bulgaria 287 69.64 0.18 3.60 Mongolia 359 67.28 0.22 2.39
Cambodia 467 45.33 0.17 6.08 Montenegro 145 53.61 0.16 -
Croatia 359 76.72 0.21 2.46 Nepal 482 58.11 0.35 4.55
Czech 250 55.36 0.13 3.40 Poland 534 53.93 0.17 4.26
DRC 511 5.24 0.38 8.02 Romania 532 41.41 0.31 3.99
Djibouti 263 31.09 0.11 - Serbia 358 43.56 0.17 3.17
Estonia 270 73.70 0.06 2.76 Slovenia 270 70.79 0.24 3.63
FYROM 359 49.21 0.22 2.90 Tajikistan 348 17.86 0.23 3.37
Georgia 357 39.85 0.20 3.24 Tanzania 771 17.21 0.48 5.73
Ghana 711 16.99 0.62 5.57 Turkey 1,319 70.19 0.08 -
Hungary 306 50.76 0.08 3.87 Uganda 736 15.52 0.29 6.63
Jordan 573 72.33 0.37 4.57 Ukraine 983 73.96 0.19 2.40
Kazakhstan 570 35.58 0.09 2.36 Yemen 353 6.34 0.29 6.65
Kenya 767 31.63 0.20 5.48 Zambia 704 16.54 0.35 3.60
Mean 45.51 0.22 3.90
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. PC / GDP: credit to private sector in % of GDP; CF: share
nancially constrained rms; VS: within-country variance of rm sales.
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Table 7: Summary statistics at the country-level, cross-section 2009
2009
Country Obs. PC / GDP CF VS Country Obs. PC / GDP CF VS
Albania 52 36.92 0.17 2.32 Latvia 264 104.55 0.25 4.38
Armenia 371 24.86 0.32 3.69 Lesotho 146 12.84 0.24 5.69
Azerbaijan 360 19.07 0.30 2.95 Liberia 147 12.20 0.35 9.17
Benin 148 22.47 0.61 6.38 Lithuania 268 69.73 0.26 3.33
Bhutan 244 32.42 0.27 4.06 Madagascar 434 11.52 0.39 3.67
Bosnia and Herzegovina 360 65.37 0.26 2.30 Malawi 149 13.38 0.44 6.71
Brazil 1,783 48.87 0.49 6.48 Mauritius 397 82.74 0.41 4.78
Bulgaria 274 73.11 0.17 4.13 Micronesia 62 21.30 0.24 3.02
Burkina Faso 393 17.02 0.72 4.81 Moldova 346 36.00 0.38 3.56
Cameroon 361 11.48 0.52 6.23 Mongolia 345 40.30 0.37 4.64
CapeVerde 148 57.96 0.39 6.94 Montenegro 115 76.54 0.10 2.95
Chad 148 3.93 0.48 4.40 Nepal 486 59.18 0.10 4.26
Congo 122 4.92 0.43 5.23 Niger 147 12.20 0.51 4.69
Croatia 99 66.71 0.24 3.34 Philippines 1,280 29.16 0.11 5.11
Czech 244 49.86 0.23 3.72 Poland 429 49.75 0.24 4.40
Ivory Coast 512 16.43 0.70 7.41 Romania 497 46.15 0.34 3.71
Eritrea 172 16.77 0.01 1.59 Russia 976 45.26 0.42 4.09
Estonia 259 105.11 0.07 3.80 Samoa 108 39.53 0.17 3.94
FYROM 362 43.87 0.24 3.67 Serbia 382 42.55 0.30 4.01
Fiji 159 89.62 0.08 - Sierra Leone 150 8.22 0.37 3.89
Gabon 172 10.12 0.26 9.99 Slovenia 276 90.69 0.18 3.33
Hungary 285 68.04 0.10 3.95 Timor-Leste 148 12.66 0.21 6.18
Indonesia 1,314 27.66 0.13 8.06 Togo 153 19.75 0.53 7.80
Kazakhstan 532 50.27 0.32 3.78 Tonga 145 47.09 0.10 1.84
Kosovo 176 34.34 0.16 - Vanuatu 126 62.98 0.29 2.54
Laos 358 17.24 0.19 3.70 Vietnam 1,024 103.32 0.15 3.59
Mean 41.02 0.29 4.67
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. PC / GDP: credit to private sector in % of GDP; CF: share
nancially constrained rms; VS: within-country variance of rm sales.
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